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SYMPOSIUM: RECODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL
LAWS
INTRODUCTION
by Francis A. Allen*
The revision of American criminal legislation, both state and
federal, has been for many years one of the most insistently
required tasks of law reform. Even yet its urgency and importance
are not fully realized. There are, however, signs that a genuine
movement toward rethinking and restating our criminal jurispru-
dence is under way. This Symposium seeks to give encour-
agement and guidance to the revision movement by collecting
relevant experience and reflections from a few of those who
participated in pioneering ventures in criminal law codification.
Recent years have brought additional reasons for concern
about the state of our criminal legislation, whether in the fields of
substantive law, procedure or corrections. For a long time the
attainment of criminal justice has been impeded by the defi-
ciencies of the statutes. The language of the legislation is
frequently incapable either of giving the citizen adequate notice of
the conduct subject to criminal penalties or of providing the
courts with standards sufficient to guide and limit their operations.
An example of these problems of articulation is provided by the
criminal statutes in Illinois, as they existed in the years before the
Criminal Code of 1961. Those statutes employed about a dozen
and one-half undefined statutory terms to designate the basic
mental states required to be shown in prosecutions under these
laws. The difficulty was that fifteen or sixteen terms were being
used to convey not more than five or six distinct ideas. The result
was confusion and futility; and what was true in Illinois before
legislative revision remains true in many American jurisdictions.
Moreover, the statutes ordinarily reflect no coherent or consistent
body of principle, but, on the contrary, are often the product of ad
hoc responses to particular problems coming to the legislature's
attention at various times over the years. Statutes revealing no
considered or consistent point of view are afflicted by internal
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conflicts of policy, redundancies and gaps in vital provisions. It is
not too much to say that in most jurisdictions there is no such
thing as a deliberate policy relating to the administration of crimi-
nal justice, and while this fact is the product of more than defects
in the statutes, the deficiencies of the laws play a large role in
creating and maintaining this condition.
All of this is familiar knowledge to those who have devoted any
considerable attention to the criminal law and its administration.
There may be at least one further observation worth making,
however. The criminal law and all law is facing a crisis of legi-
timacy. By "legitimacy" I mean nothing mystical or mysterious. I
am referring to the capacity of the law to evoke the willing
compliance of the overwhelming fraction of the population, even
in cases in which many persons believe that some particular laws
are dubious and even unjust. No doubt we have tended to exag-
gerate the degree of legitimacy attained by the legal order in the
past, but I see no reason to doubt that in recent years serious
losses in the authority of the law and of the agencies that apply it
have been sustained. Such losses may be an inevitable cost of
necessary social and institutional change, but they can easily be-
come exorbitant. One of the advantages of a widespread dis-
position to give allegiance to the law and its institutions is that it
tends to reduce the levels of force applied by the state in main-
taining public order. Challenge and resistance to the law-enforcing
agencies, on the other hand, produce escalation in the kinds and
amounts of public forces those agencies employ. This enhance-
ment of force may, in turn, produce more fundamental alienation
of significantly large groups from the legitimate agencies of
society. The result may be further increases in the levels of force
employed by official agencies, until the fundamental conditions of
a free society are threatened or destroyed.
In a time when there is a strong disposition of many to withhold
their allegiance from the legal order, the familiar failures of the
criminal law and its administration, toward which we have dis-
played a formidable tolerance for decades, take on a new and
ominous significance. We simply cannot afford the deficient crimi-
nal statutes that burden most American jurisdictions. This is true
because such legislation results in inefficiency and injustice; and
inefficiency and injustice in the criminal law produce intolerable
losses in the legitimacy of all law. The problem of restoring
legitimacy to the legal order entails a great deal more than ex-
ercises in law reform. Nevertheless, revision of criminal legisla-
tion is an appropriate, and perhaps a necessary, starting point.
Although many of the issues implicit in the movement for
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criminal-law revision are of large and general significance, the
execution of reform poses many other practical and down-to-earth
questions. It is to these latter questions that the papers in this
Symposium are primarily directed. What agency should be re-
sponsible for drafting the new code: should the initiative come
from the law schools or the bar associations, on the one hand, or
from a legislative commission, on the other? How should the
membership of the agency be selected? What is needed by way of
research staff and drafting facilities? How is the operation to be
funded, and what is the optimum level of funding? Where should
the task begin? Is it desirable to present the legislature with a
code encompassing revision of all the statutes bearing on the
administration of criminal justice, or is it preferable to submit first
a draft of, say, substantive provisions and then move to the
procedural and correctional codes? Is it essential that the revision
be in all respects comprehensive, or are there situations in which
it is permissible to exclude areas of great importance or sensitivity
for separate treatment, such as narcotics regulation? Is there any
wisdom that can be communicated about approaches to the legis-
lature most likely to induce favorable response to the revision
when completed by the drafting group?
These questions have been posed without any conviction that
there are preordained answers applicable to all of the very
different circumstances prevailing in the various American juris-
dictions. I have convictions (or prejudices) about some of these
matters. I believe, for example, that it may be desirable to "think
small" about the apparatus required for criminal code revision.
There is a certain minimum of funding that is required: a com-
petent draftsman must be available, secretarial service must be
provided, and enough money to pay a few good law students to
research various areas of concern is indispensable. Nevertheless,
I am impressed by what can be achieved by a small group of
dedicated lawyers who are enthusiastically dedicated to the task
at hand. Sometimes affluence erodes this enthusiasm and sense of
individual responsibility. It is clear, however, that circumstances
alter cases, and that the questions posed are more of art than of
science. It is hoped that by communicating the experience of
those who have dealt with these questions in recent years, others
who will soon be embarking on similar endeavors may be pro-
vided with some insights and be aided in avoiding some pitfalls.
I do not intend to review the contents of the papers that follow.
The authors are fully capable of speaking for themselves. The
distressing experience in California, expertly set forth by Profes-
sor Sherry, raises broader issues, however; and I am disposed to
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add a word. We have entered an era in which legislative law
reform is not only important, but which has great significance for
the very survival of the legal order. The execution of law revision,
in turn, presupposes sufficient political maturity to utilize wisely
the talents of those who have special skills in the various areas of
law reform. The fact is that the group assembled in California and
which labored long and effectively to revise the criminal statutes
of that state was perhaps the most distinguished aggregation of
legal talent ever brought together in a state commission dedicated
to these purposes. I doubt that any other state could recruit a
group including so many persons of such great talent; and I am
confident that the distinction of the participants was apparent to
all competent observers, not only in the United States, but
throughout the Anglo-American legal world. Certainly, the prin-
ciple of democratic representation implies that the proposals of no
group, however distinguished or expert, need be accepted by the
representatives of a community which finds them repugnant or
uncongenial. If the mild and moderate proposals that precipitated
the California furor were unacceptable to the legislature or to the
group designated to review them in the first instance, one could
accept their rejection with good grace, however much one might
regret it or doubt its wisdom. But that these proposals should be
regarded as so unthinkable or unspeakable to justify the discharge
of a distinguished committee from the performance of its public
responsibilities is simply preposterous. That such an instance of
political know-nothingism could occur in our most populous state
is a matter of concern for the entire nation. If the vital mission of
law revision is to be achieved in this country, it is incumbent that
a higher level of sense and responsibility than revealed in Califor-
nia be damanded and obtained by those having an appreciation of
what is at stake.
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